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THE USE OF JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS
FOR IMPEACHMENT AND SENTENCING
Susan A. Sinclair*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The juvenile court system is designed to meet the social
rehabilitation and readjustment needs of the juvenile offender,' as opposed to punishing him for criminal behavior.'
Because a juvenile adjudication can stigmatize to the same degree as an adult conviction, juvenile court proceedings are
generally categorized as civil rather than criminal actions.3
Yet, despite this substantive difference in treatment, society
often views juvenile offenders in the same manner as adult
offenders.4 A commitment to a reform or training school is
o 1982 by Susan A. Sinclair
* B.A., 1975, University of Massachusetts; J.D., 1978, Howard University School
of Law; LL.M., 1981, Georgetown University Law Center, Member, District of Columbia Court of Appeals, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Association of Trial Lawyers of
America; practices law with the firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, Washington, D.C.
1. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 515 S.W.2d 421, 437 (Mo. 1974) (en banc); State v.
Arbeiter, 408 S.W.2d 26, 30 (Mo. 1966); Note, Rights and Rehabilitationin the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 281 (1967).
2. The juvenile justice system is based on the parens patriae doctrine whereby
the state acts on behalf of the child as its guardian, assuming the role of the parents
and acting in their place to secure what is in the best interest of the child. The parens
patriae doctrine had its beginning in England during the feudal period. E.g., Eyre v.
Shaftsbury, 2 P. Wms. 103, 24 Eng. Rep. 659 (1722); Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 83,
121 A. 678, 682-83 (1923); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905).
3. See generally Fagerstrom v. United States, 311 F.2d 717, 720 (8th Cir. 1963);
Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 561-63 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (Appendix A); Shioutakon
v. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Herget v. Circuit Court, 84
Wis. 2d 435, 267 N.W.2d 309 (1978); F. SUSSMAN, LAW OF JUVENILE DEINQUENCY (2d
ed. 1959); Paulsen, The Changing World of Juvenile Law-New Horizons for Juvenile Court Legislation, 40 PA. B.A. Q. 26, 27 (1968); Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The
Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HARV. L. REv. 775, 784 (1966).
But see In re Contereras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 789, 241 P.2d 631, 633 (1952) (a
statute which provided that a finding of delinquency was not to be deemed a conviction of a crime held "a legal fiction, presenting a challenge to credulity and doing
violence to reason.")
4. In the public eye, an offender is an offender, be he juvenile or adult.
The cliches of noncriminality and lack of stigma attendant upon the
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looked upon as a term of imprisonment. The juvenile offender, when he reaches adulthood, often suffers the same legal and social consequences that an adult offender faces with
a prior criminal conviction.
Many state legislators have recognized that it is impossible to change societal views toward youthful offenders. In recognition of the debilitating legal and social consequences resulting from a juvenile adjudication of delinquency,' they
have enacted statutes seeking to restore the civil rights of the
former juvenile offender by requiring juvenile adjudications to
juvenile court process have so often been repeated that we have become piously obtuse to the fact that the enlightened instrumentality of
the juvenile court is frequently not as felicitous in practice as it is in
theory.
Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders:
A Problem of Status, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 147, 170, [hereinafter cited as Gough]. In
Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 385 S.E. 444 (1946), the court recognized that:
[t]he stigma of conviction will reflect upon him for life. It hurts his self
respect. It may, at some inopportune, unfortunate moment, rear its ugly
head to destroy his opportunity for advancement and blast his ambition
to build up a character and reputation entitling him to the esteem and
respect of his fellowman.
See also E. J. v. State, 471 P.2d 367 (Alaska 1970); People v. Navarro, 7 Cal. 3d 248,
497 P.2d 481, 102 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1972); Dorothy D. v. New York City Probation
Dep't, 49 N.Y.2d 212, 400 N.E.2d 1342, 424 N.Y.S.2d 890 (1980).
The philosophy behind juvenile justice is rehabilitation and treatment, yet the
juvenile system, to some degree, imposes crime and punishment on its former offenders. Though the statutory goal is the best interest of the child, once the child is an
adult the adjudication may surface in spite of the statutes and haunt the child the
rest of his adult life. See Bazelon, Racism, Classism, and the Juvenile Process, 53
JUDICATURE 373 (1970); Mahoney, The Effect of Labeling Upon Youths in the Juvenile Justice System: A Review of the Evidence, 8 LAW & Soc'y REv. 583 (1974); see
also Herget v. Circuit Court, 84 Wis. 2d 435, 267 N.W.2d 309 (1978).
5. In State v. Miller, 214 Kan. 538, 520 P.2d 1248 (1974), the problem confronting a juvenile subsequent to an adjudication was described as follows:
It is not explicitly articulated disabilities which are most troublesome to
the reformed offender. It is rather the less-direct economic and social
reprisals engendered by his brand as an adjudicated criminal. The vagaries of public sentiment often discriminate against persons with a
criminal past, with very little regard for the severity of the offense, and
they do not frequently distinguish between persons arrested and acquitted or otherwise released and persons convicted. This is particularly true
in the vital matter of employment, which perhaps as much as anything
influences a man's concept of himself and his worth, and accordingly
influences the values which guide his conduct.
Id. at 542-43, 520 P.2d at 1252 (quoting Gough, supra note 4 at 153).
Similar problems also exist in the use of convictions set aside under the Federal
Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-26 (1976). See Zacharias, The Use and
Abuses of Convictions Set Aside Under the Federal Youth Corrections Act 1981
DUKE L.J. 477.
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be kept confidential. The confidentiality is expected to eliminate the stigma of a finding of delinquency and to prevent the
"presumably beneficient procedures [of the juvenile court
from becoming] the basis for criminal records which could be
used to harass a person throughout his life."
The statutes currently in existence can be grouped into
three categories. The first category mandates the destruction
of adjudication records of juveniles, the second requires the
sealing of adjudication records, and the more limited third
group contains provisions that prohibit mention of juvenile
adjudications in subsequent court proceedings. All three types
of statutes are intended to have the legal effect of restoring
the former juvenile offender to his status prior to the wrongdoing which resulted in the adjudication.
6. Rappeport, Some Legal Aspects of Juvenile Court Proceedings, 46 VA. L.
908, 917 (1960) (quoting Thomas v. United States, 121 F.2d 905, 909 (D.C. Cir.
1941)). See, e.g., State v. Guerrero, 58 Ariz. 421, 120 P.2d 798 (1942); Kiracofe v.
Commonwealth, 198 Va. 833, 97 S.E.2d 14 (1957).
7. State v. Miller, 214 Kan 538, 543, 520 P.2d 1248, 1253 (1974). There has been
tremendous confusion about the terms "sealing" and "expungement." Often the
terms are used synonomously, but they are not the same.
By an expungement statute is meant a legislative provision for the eradication of a record of conviction or adjudication upon fulfillment of prescribed conditions, usually the successful discharge of the offender from
probation and the passage of a period of time without further offense. It
is not simply a lifting of disabilities attendant upon conviction and a
restoration of civil rights, though this is a significant part of its effect. It
is rather a redefinition of status, a process of erasing the legal event of
conviction or adjudication, and thereby restoring to the regenerate offender his status quo ante.
Gough, supra note 4, at 149 (footnote omitted). See also Baum, Wiping Out a Criminal or Juvenile Record, 40 CAL. ST. B.J. 816, 821-28 (1965); Booth, The Expungement Myth, 38 L.A. B. BULL. 161, 163-65 (1963).
REV.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

522 (rev. 5th ed. 1979) defines expungement of record

as a "[p]rocess by which record of criminal conviction is destroyed or sealed after
expiration of time." See also 35 C.J.S. 343 (1960). The word expunged has mistakenly
been used by the legislature in the labeling of statutes that merely seal the adjudication records. For example, COL. REV. STAT. § 19-1-11 (1978), which is labeled as an
expungement statute, does not in fact provide for the destruction of the juvenile adjudication record, but merely calls for sealing the records. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-805d
(Supp. 1980); See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31-56 (1977).
A typical statute which implicitly provides for expungement is often labeled "destruction of records." For example, in Arizona, Indiana, Florida, Missouri, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Montana and Virginia, the statutes provide for the destruction of
the adjudication records. See generally infra notes 16-17. A statute typical of the
destruction statute can be found in Arizona. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-247(A) (Supp.
1981) which provides in pertinent part that "[o]n application of a person who has
been adjudicated delinquent or incorrigible or on the court's own motion, and after a
hearing, the juvenile court shall order the destruction of the files and records, includ-
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There is a substantial lack of uniformity among the
courts in applying these statutes. Where the statutes provide
for the sealing of records, some courts have permitted them to
be unsealed on the basis of exceptions written judicially into
the law.' Where provisions prohibit the use in evidence of a
juvenile adjudication, courts have found reason to allow their
circumvention.9 Varied and even inconsistent interpretations
are the hallmark of juvenile statutes, which on their face appear unambiguous.10
This article examines the existing statutes and the methods courts have used to circumvent them by allowing the introduction of adjudication records into evidence for impeachment and sentencing purposes. Section II of this article will
discuss the three types of statutes which address juvenile adjudication records and will differentiate among their intended
meanings. Section III will focus upon the practical effect of
these statutes, identifying those situations where the courts
have permitted the use of juvenile adjudications for impeachment and sentencing despite the terms of the statutes. The
article will also discuss the constitutional implications of the
use of such records, especially in light of the defendant's right
to confront witnesses.
ing arrest records, in the proceeding ....
8. A juvenile who has been adjudicated delinquent is supposedly shielded by
virtue of statutory provisions, prohibiting the use of expunged or sealed records, from
adverse effects of his juvenile court record. As Justice Musmanno pointed out, in his
dissent in In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 612, 109 A.2d 523, 529 (1954) such is not the
case:
A most disturbing fallacy abides in the notion that a Juvenile Court Record does its owner no harm . . . . In point of fact it will be a witness
against him in the court of business and commerce, it will be a bar sinister to him in the court of society where the penalties inflicted for deviation from conventional codes can be as ruinous as those imposed in any
criminal court, it will be a sword of Damaocles hanging over his head in
public life, it will be a weapon to hold him at bay as he seeks respectable
and honorable employment.
9. Kogon & Loughery, Sealing and Expungement of Criminal Records-The
Big Lie, 61 J. CiM. L.C. & P.S. 378, 384 (1970); "Expungement Statutes are so riddled with legislative and case law exceptions that they are almost wholly ineffectual."
Pettler & Hilman, Criminal Records of Arrest and Conviction: Expungement from
the General Public Access, 3 CAL. W.L. REv. 121, 125 (1967).
10. See generally infra notes 44-46.
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STATUTES PROVIDING FOR THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF JUVE-

NILE RECORDS

A.

Destruction of Adjudication Records

The relief afforded to the former offender often depends
on the degree to which the legislature is willing to erase all
traces of a juvenile adjudication." Only a few states have procedures whereby a juvenile's adjudication record is physically
destroyed when he becomes an adult.1 2 One prototype of such
a procedure is found in North Dakota. 8 The statute initially
requires the sealing of the delinquent child's adjudication
records two years after the final disposition order and final
discharge of the child from the juvenile court's jurisdiction.
Sometime subsequent to sealing, the child, his parent, or his
guardian may petition the court for an order destroying all
orders, records, papers and exhibits relating to the child. The
court must enter the order so long as the former offender has
not been adjudicated a misdemeanant of a crime involving
moral turpitude, a delinquent, or an unruly child since his discharge from the juvenile court's jurisdiction. The child must,
in addition, have no pending criminal or juvenile proceeding
when he moves to have his records destroyed.1 4
11. In California, for example, the judge or clerk of the juvenile court or the
probation officer may destroy all records, papers, minute book entries, and dockets of
the proceedings of the juvenile five years after the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is
terminated. All of these records and documents are microfilmed, however, prior to
their destruction, which in effect makes the California statute the equivalent of a
sealing statute until the person reaches the age of 38 at which time destruction of
documents is mandated. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 826, 826.5 (West Supp.

1981).
12. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-247(A) (Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.12
(West Supp. 1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-8-2 (Buros Supp. 1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
211.321 (Vernon Supp. 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-604 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 27-20-54 (Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1506 (West Supp. 1981); VA.
CODE § 16.1-306 (Supp. 1981).
13. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-54 (Supp. 1979).

14. Id. In North Dakota, once the records are destroyed the proceeding is
treated as if it never occurred and the court, law enforcement agencies, and representative agencies must reply that no record exists regarding the person who is the subject of inquiry. The former offender may also reply in the negative to such inquiries.
The juvenile court may, however, keep the records for research and statistical purposes provided all names are expunged from the records.
The records of those former offenders who do not meet the requirements enunciated in the statute, must be destroyed after ten years have elapsed from the final
discharge of the juvenile from the juvenile court's jurisdiction. Id.
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Although other destruction statutes take a variety of
forms, the basic purpose of each is to overcome the stigma of
delinquency. Thus, the statutes usually provide for the destruction not only of the adjudication of delinquency, but all
15
other records, social histories, and court files as well. Under
each statute obliteration of the juvenile record is the goal toward which the former juvenile offender is intended to strive
through proof of rehabilitation. A "waiting period" of clean
conduct is usually prescribed before the destruction will take
place. Furthermore, in view of the extraordinary nature of the
relief provided in the statutes, many exclude juvenile offenders deemed not to deserve the benefits of the statute. These
exclusions often are rooted in the seriousness of the offense
committed.1 6 Other statutes avoid blanket exclusions by requiring that a court determine the ex-offender to be rehabilitated 17 before relieving him of the burden of his record.
The statutes, which by their terms provide for the physical obliteration of the juvenile's adjudication record, are by
definition intended to confer a significant practical benefit on
the juvenile. There is to be no trace of the juvenile adjudication; upon reaching adulthood, the juvenile is to start with a
clean slate. s Nevertheless, in practice many of these statutes
15.

But see Mo.

ANN. STAT.

§ 211.321 (Vernon Supp. 1981) which empowers the

court to destroy "all social histories, records and information other than the official
court file .... " (emphasis added). The official court file is merely sealed.
16. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-54 (Supp. 1979); see also VA. CODE § 16.1-306
(1981) where the juvenile adjudication record may be destroyed provided the juvenile
has not been found guilty of a felony. Those juveniles who are not eligible to have
their records destroyed may have their records sealed and later destroyed. Those
records that are sealed may, however, be opened for purposes of sentencing.
17. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-247(A) (Supp. 1981); IND. CODE ANN. §
31-6-8-2 (Burns Supp. 1979). But see OKLA. STAT. ANN. 10 tit. § 1506 (West Supp.
1981) (permits the former offender, one year after he reaches majority or one year
after jurisdiction of the juvenile court is terminated, whichever occurs later, to petition the court for the destruction and obliteration of the entire file and record of his
case without any considerations).
18. Although this article is concerned only with such legal consequences as impeachment and sentencing, there may be other consequences. The former offender,
for example, may find that he will be discriminated against when he seeks employment and may be ineligible to join certain Armed Forces because the statute does not
permit a negative response to an inquiry as to whether he has ever been adjudicated a
delinquent. Lemert, The Juvenile Court-Quest and Realities, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ENFORCEMENT AND AD. OF JUST., TASK FORCE REPORT: Juv. DELINQUENCY AND
YOUTH CRIME 91 (1967).
Although the FBI is not required to destroy or seal those juvenile adjudication
records that are subject to the state statutes, it appears the FBI always returns such
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have proven less than satisfactory in fulfilling this goal. In
many states, for example, the legislature has neglected to provide a statute to complement the destruction statute which
forbids the subsequent use of a "destroyed" adjudication if,
perchance, its existence is known to or discovered by a third
party. In this situation, a former offender may find himself

punished or stigmatized by the adjudication just as if it had
never been sealed or destroyed. But by and large, the destruction statutes afford juveniles the most far-reaching relief
among the existing forms of adjudication-limiting legislation.
B.

Sealing of Adjudication Records

Most jurisdictions have enacted statutes that merely authorize the sealing of the adjudication record" after the juvenile has reached the age of majority or after the passage of a
specified period of time. 20 These statutes have proven to be
inadequate in providing a shield of confidentiality for the former juvenile offender because most are riddled with exceptions. In their application the statutes create only an illusion
records to the state authorities if requested to do so. See Crow v. Keeley, 512 F.2d
752, 755 (8th Cir. 1975); Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Menard v.
Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1025 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
See also Note, Expungement in Ohio: Assimilation Into Society for the Former
Criminal, 8 AKRON L. REV. 480, 490 (1974-75); Note, The Effect of Expungement on
a Criminal Conviction, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 127, 140 (1967).
19. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.090(a) (1979); COLO. REV. STAT., § 19-1-111 (1978);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2335(C) (1981); KAN. STAT. § 38-805d (Supp. 1980); MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3.828(c) (Supp. 1980); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 43-240-243 (1978);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.275 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 4-67d (West Supp. 1980);
N.M. STAT. ANN. 32-1-45 (1978); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8-57.1 (Supp. 1981); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-3a-56 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 33 § 665 (Supp. 1980). See also
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 5038 (Supp. III
1979).
Under most of the sealing statutes, the records to be sealed include the court's
official records, information, and social records pertaining to the juvenile, including
all criminal records against him and their punishment, with the exception of traffic
offenses.
20. See, e.g., CON. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-146 (West Supp. 1982); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-2335(c)(a)(1)(b) (1981); KAN. STAT. § 38-805d (Supp. 1980); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 32-1-45 (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-54 (Supp. 1979). But see, CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 781 (West Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.12(2) (West Supp. 1981).
It should also be noted that like those statutes providing for the destruction of
the juvenile record, not all persons are entitled to have their juvenile adjudication
records sealed. For example, in New Jersey the records will not be sealed if the former juvenile offender has been convicted of a crime, disorderly conduct or adjudged
delinquent since the juvenile court's termination of jurisdiction over him. N.J. STAT.
ANN 2A: 46-67a(2) (West Supp. 1981). See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-54 (1979).
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of confidentiality.21 Some, for example, permit the district at-

torney or any agency "caring" for the medical or psychiatric
needs of the former offender to unseal and inspect the records
simply by petitioning the court."' Others are sufficiently ambiguous to permit the use of the sealed record for impeachmenta' and sentencing purposes.24 A third group provides a
catch-all mechanism for the unsealing of the record where an

undefined "good cause" is shown." These afford broad judicial discretion in determining when the records should be disclosed. Case law reveals a total lack of consistency in the deci-

sions interpreting these statutes among states and even within
individual states.26
One advantage inherent in many of the sealing statutes is
that the former offender is permitted to respond negatively to
inquiries on whether he had a prior adjudication.27 Court per21. In the case of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, (1967) Justice Fortas put it quite
simply, "[the] claim of secrecy . . . is more rhetoric than reality." Id. at 24.
As pointed out by authors Eager and Logermann in Juvenile Justice, 1974-75
ANNUAL SURVEY

OF

AMERICAN LAW

547, 549-50 n.16 (1976) the Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-42 (1976) (prior to 1977
amendment), permits the unsealing and release of the record upon:
(1) an inquiry from another court of law; (2) an inquiry from an agency
preparing a presentence report for another court; (3) an inquiry from a
law enforcement agency if the request is related to investigation of a
crime or a position within that agency; (4) an inquiry from a treatment
agency or an institution to which the juvenile has been committed by
the court; or (5) an inquiry from an agency considering the person for a
position directly affecting the national security.
Id. In 1977 the Act was amended to additionally allow release to victims of a juvenile,
or to the victim's immediate family members if the victim is deceased, of the juvenile's record relating to the disposition of the case. 18 U.S.C. § 5038 (Supp. III 1979).
Courts are also inconsistent in their interpretation of the confidentiality and
prohibiting provisions of the statutes.
22. NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.275 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 4-67d (West Supp.
1981).
23. See infra notes 47-69 and accompanying text.
24. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(g) (1971); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26.8.57.1
(Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. § 38-805d (Supp. 1980); D.C. CODE ANN. § 26.8.57.1 (Supp.
1981).
25. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.090(a) (1979); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §
3.828(c) (Supp. 1980); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2335(c) (Supp. 1981). Cf. COLO. REV.
STAT. § 19-1-11(f)(1973) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-56 (1965), which only permit
the person whose records were sealed to petition for inspection of the sealed records.
26. Comment, Inadequacies of the Juvenile Sealing Procedure in California, 7
W. L. REV. 421 (1971). See generally infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
27. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 826(a) (West Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 19-1-11 (1978); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2335(c) (1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-805d
(Supp. 1980); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 60 (West Supp. 1981) G.L.C. 119 § 60;
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sonnel and agencies are also directed to corroborate, in response to any inquiry regarding the former juvenile offender,
that no record exists.2 8 Nevertheless, sealing statutes in general afford juveniles far less protection than the destruction
statutes. Because the records are maintained, there are inevitably situations in which they are unsealed, inspected and
used. And the "good cause" for which courts permit such un29
sealing has been interpreted broadly.
C.

Restricted Use of Adjudication Records

The third method of handling juvenile adjudication
records is to leave them unimpaired, but to restrict their use
in subsequent court proceedings. Many states, in addition to
providing that an adjudication shall not be deemed a conviction, 80 prohibit the use of juvenile court records as evidence
against the former offender in any court proceeding.3 1 Other
NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.275 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-4-67d (West Supp. 1981);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-56 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33 § 665 (Supp. 1980).
28. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-111 (1978); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2335(c) (1981);
KAN. STAT. ANN. 38-805d (Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-31-56 (1977).
These statutes do not preclude an inquiry of the former offender as to whether
he had had an adjudication sealed or destroyed.
29. In the case of In re R.C.C., 151 N.J. Super. 174, 376 A.2d 614 (1977) the
court pointed out that there is a vast difference between having a record destroyed as
opposed to sealed. In explaining these differences Judge Staller stated:
The [destruction] of records is far more effective than is the sealing of
records in destroying all traces of contact with the criminal justice system . . . . The [destruction] of records prevents their use by anyone,
while sealed records are available on court order . . . . Additionally,
later convictions do not reactivate [destroyed] records. [The Juvenile
Statute] provides that a later adjudication of delinquency automatically
nullifies the sealing order . . . . [S]ealed arrest records may be maintained by the law enforcement agencies originally possessing such
records, while [destroyed] records may not be maintained by anyone.
Id. at 176, 376 A.2d at 616 (citations omitted). See also Note, Expungement and
Sealing of Arrest and Conviction Records: The New Jersey Response, 5 SE'ON HALL
L. REV. 864 (1974).
30. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-207A (Supp. 1980); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
203 (West Supp. 1981).
31. See ALASKA STAT. § 4 7.10.080(g) (1979) ("The commitment and placement
of a child and evidence given in the court are not admissible as evidence against the
minor in a subsequent case or proceedings in any other court ....
"); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 39.12 (West Supp. 1981) (juvenile court record is inadmissible in evidence in
any other civil or criminal proceeding); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 119 § 60 (West
Supp. 1980) (an adjudication of delinquency is not admissible in any proceeding involving the juvenile, except subsequent delinquency proceedings or for purposes of
disposition); See Deja v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 488, 168 N.W.2d 856 (1969); Berfield v.
State, 458 P.2d 1008 (Alaska 1969) (Alaska has a similar statute); State v. Jones, 91
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states have prohibited the use of the adjudication," "for any
purpose whatsoever." 83 In discussing these types of statutes,
Professor Wigmore states:
This measure is a deduction from the modern enlightened
principle of reforming the juvenile offender and then protecting him from afterwards being dragged back into the
criminal class by the automatic operation of the law for
habitual offenders.
But the enthusiasts for social welfare, in the framing
of these enlightened Acts, have gone too far in some respects. (1) The penal treatment of such a juvenile in later
years, if he appears as an adult in the Criminal Court
should depend in part on his entire life-record, and for
this purpose the Juvenile Court records should be usable.
(2) In charges of rape, incest, etc., where the complainant
is a young girl, her credibility may be affected by her unchaste tendencies. False charges of the sort by girls of
such tendencies are not uncommon. Unless that tendency
is inquired into, the story becomes plausible, and many a
man has probably gone to the penitentiary as the innocent victim of such tales. The juvenile court record of the
complainant should unquestionably be admitted; to exclude it is a suppression of means of truth, and it is indefensible on any ground; in3 this aspect these statutes are
unscientific and anti-social. 4
Notwithstanding the statutory provisions restricting the use
N.J. Super. 67, 219 A.2d 193 (1966). See generally, Rivas v. State, 501 S.W.2d 918
(Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Kiracofe v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 833, 97 S.E.2d 14 (1957);
Banas v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 468, 149 N.W.2d 571, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 962 (1967).
32. Once the juvenile adjudication records are sealed, the proceedings are
deemed "never to have occurred" and the person whose record was sealed and the
court may reply that no record exists with respect to the prior juvenile adjudication.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-111 (1978); See also CAL. WFLF. & INST. CODE § 781 (West
Supp. 1980); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2335 (1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-805(d) (Supp.
1979); NEv. REV. STAT. § 62.275 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-45 (1981); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 27-20-54 (1981); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78-3a-56 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §
665 (1981).
33. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A23 (1970) provides:
A disposition of any child under this chapter, or any evidence given in
such case, shall not in any civil, criminal or any other cause or proceeding whatever in any court, be lawful or proper evidence against such
child for any purpose whatever, except in subsequent cases against the
same child under this chapter.
See also S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-202 (1962); Massey v. State, 256 A.2d 271 (Del. 1969);
App. 2d 243, 225 N.E.2d 76 (1967).
People v. Crable, 80 Ill.
34. 1 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 673-76 (3d ed. 1940).
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of juvenile adjudication, many courts have ignored the legislative direction and followed Professor Wigmore's philosophy
by permitting the subsequent use of the adjudication for impeachment and sentencing purposes.
III.

SUBSEQUENT USES OF JUVENILE ADJUDICATION RECORDS

Issues involving the use of juvenile records most often
arise in situations where the government or a party to a criminal proceeding seeks to introduce a juvenile record into evidence for purposes of impeachment or where the government
or the trial court attempts to use the juvenile's record in sentencing proceedings. Whether to sanction the use of juvenile
records for impeachment and sentencing purposes often
presents courts with difficult problems of statutory construction and conflicting policy considerations.
The concept of impeachment is grounded on the fundamental principle that the finder of fact should have the benefit of evidence bearing on the credibility of a witness. Fairness
dictates that once a witness takes the stand, counsel may inquire into his general credibility. A decision totally prohibiting the use of juvenile records limits the truth-finding procedure. 5 On the other hand, a decision permitting their use for
impeachment nullifies the protections accorded juveniles and
subverts the entire policy underlying the statutorily prescribed confidentiality.
Conflicting policy considerations are no less apparent in
situations where there is an attempt to use juvenile records in
sentencing proceedings. Traditionally, courts have considered
a wide variety of factors in determining a sentence, including
data and information which is generally inadmissible at trial.
A sentencing judge who must balance punishment and deterrence against the rehabilitation needs of the defendant faces a
difficult task generally requiring the "fullest information possible" concerning the defendant's life and characteristics.
Nevertheless, for a court to consider an adjudication which
has been destroyed or sealed runs counter to the policy behind those statutes designed to give a qualifying juvenile a
clean slate once he becomes an adult.
A careful examination of cases addressing the use of a ju35. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (constitutional considerations may require the use of juvenile adjudications).
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venile record for impeachment and sentencing purposes
reveals that too often judges have permitted the use of juvenile records without adequately considering the policies underlying the confidentiality statutes. Even less justifiably,
some courts have allowed the use of juvenile records despite a
clear statutory prohibition. If the effectiveness of the various
statutes protecting the confidentiality of juvenile records is
measured by the frequency with which such records are permitted to be used for impeachment and sentencing purposes,
it is immediately apparent that the statutes are woefully
deficient.
A.

Impeachment of Defendant

Courts have been far from consistent in their decisions
regarding the admissibility of juvenile adjudications for the
purpose of impeaching a defendant. The courts that have excluded the adjudications have done so reluctantly, under the
constraint of the clear words or express policy of a confidentiality statute." Nevertheless, while forbidding the impeach-

ment of a defendant's credibility by the use of an adjudication
record,8 7 many courts have nullified the effect of this exclusion
36. One enlightened court in explaining the reason for excluding juvenile adjudications stated:
[t]he fundamental philosophy of the juvenile court laws is that a delinquent child is to be considered and treated not as a criminal, but as a
person requiring care, education, and protection. He is not thought of as
'a bad man who should be punished, but as an erring or sick child who
needs help.' Thus, the primary function of juvenile courts, properly considered is not conviction or punishment for crime, but crime prevention
and delinquency rehabilitation. It would be a serious breach of public
faith, therefore, to permit these informal and presumably beneficient
procedures to become the basis for criminal records, which could be
used to harass a person throughout his life. There is no more reason for
permitting their use for such a purpose than there would be to pry into
school records or to compile family and community recollections concerning youthful indiscretions of persons who were fortunate enough to
avoid the juvenile court.
Thomas v. United States 121 F.2d 905, 908-09 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
37. The following cases hold or recognize that a juvenile adjudication may not
be used to impeach the general credibility of a witness whether or not the witness is
the defendant. Cotton v. United States, 355 F.2d 480 (10th Cir. 1966); Brown v.
United States, 338 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Price v. United States, 282 F.2d 769
(4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 848 (1961); Thomas v. United States, 121 F.2d
905 (D.C. Cir 1941); Hammac v. State, 44 Ala. App. 459, 212 So.2d 849 (1968); State
v. Guerrero, 58 Ariz. 421, 120 P.2d 798 (1942); In Re Nash, 61 Cal. 2d 491, 393 P.2d
405, 39 Cal. Rptr. 205 (1964); People v. Hoffman, 199 Cal. 155, 248 P. 504 (1926);
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by permitting impeachment through questions meant to uncover the underlying act of misconduct upon which the former

adjudications were based. 8 They reason that prior bad acts
which are evidenced by an adjudication of delinquency or the
defendant's own admission are relevant because they "throw
light upon the merits, and aid in a correct solution of the issues. .

.

." The former juvenile offender may thus find that

he is questioned about the facts underlying his juvenile adjudication despite statutes designed to protect him from precisely such questioning.40
The "underlying act" method of cross-examination was
allowed in People v. Vidal,41 where the defendant was questioned about two offenses that he committed when he was a
juvenile. 42 The court stated: "While the [Code] may bar use of
the adjudication per se to impeach, [it does not] preclude
cross-examination based on the underlying immoral act.

'48

In

People v. Gomez, 152 Cal. App. 2d 139, 313 P.2d 58 (1957); Lineback v. State, 260
Ind. 503, 301 N.E.2d 636 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 929 (1974); Woodley v. State,
227 Ind. 407, 86 N.E.2d 529 (1949); Coleman v. Staples, 446 S.W.2d 557 (Ky. 1969);
State v. Kelly, 169 La. 753, 126 So. 49 (1930); Westfall v. State, 243 Md. 413, 221 A.2d
646 (1966); State v. Tolias, 326 S.W.2d 329 (Mo. 1959); State v. DePaola, 5 N.J. 1, 73
A.2d 564 (1950); State v. Brown, 132 N.J. Super. 584, 334 A.2d 392 (1975); Martinez
v. Avila, 76 N.M. 372, 415 P.2d 59 (1966); People v. Duffy, 36 N.Y.2d 258, 326 N.E.2d
804, 367 N.Y.S.2d 236, (1975); People v. Peele, 12 N.Y.2d 890, 188 N.E.2d 265, 237
N.Y.S.2d 999 (1963); State v. Burr, 18 Or. App. 494, 525 P.2d 1067 (1974); Hendrickson v. Meyers, 393 Pa. 224, 144 A.2d 367 (1958); Rivas v. State, 501 S.W.2d 918 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1973); Warren v. State, 514 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. 1974); Kiracofe v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 833, 97 S.E.2d 14 (1957); State v. Wilson, 16 Wash. App. 434, 557
P.2d 18 (1976); Deja v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 488, 168 N.W.2d 856 (1969); Banas v. State,
34 Wis. 2d 468, 149 N.W.2d 571, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 962 (1967).
38. See Comment, Evidence-Impeachment of Witnesses-Use .f Adjudications of Juvenile Delinquency and Specific Acts of Misconduct Committed by
Juveniles, 33 N.Y.U. L. REv. 406 (1958); Annot. 147 A.L.R. 444 (1943).
39. 289 Mich. 185, 192, 286 N.W. 206, 208 (1939).
40. See State v. Marinski, 139 Ohio St. 559, 41 N.E.2d 387 (1942) where the
court felt that the purpose of a trial was to determine the truth and a rule prohibiting
the prosecutor from questioning the defendant regarding the prior adjudication
would allow the defendant to deceive the court and accomplish a miscarriage of
justice.
41. 26 N.Y.2d 249, 257 N.E.2d 886, 309 N.Y.S.2d 336 (1970).
42. The two offenses involved possession of two forged auto licenses and an assault on a policy officer. Section 913-n of the NEw YORK CODE OF CRIMINAL PRocEDURE provided that "no youth shall be denominated a criminal by reason of such
determination nor shall such determination be deemed a conviction." Id. at 257
N.E.2d at 890, 309 N.Y.S. 2d at 340.
43. Id. at 253, 257 N.E.2d at 889, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 340. See also United States v.
Canniff, 521 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1059 (1976). For cases
which declare that being adjudged a juvenile delinquent in a federal court is not
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sustaining use of the facts underlying an adjudication for impeachment, other courts have similarly maintained that the
defendant is not being impeached with the adjudication in violation of the statute, but rather he is only cross-examined
' 44
regarding an "immoral, vicious or criminal [act] of his life,"
which bears on his credibility as a witness."
As a result of these narrow judicial interpretations of destruction and sealing statutes, a juvenile may find that a statute that leaves his adjudication unimpaired but provides that

the adjudication should not be used as evidence affords him
more protection than a destruction statute. 4 This result flies
deemed a criminal conviction and may not be used to attack a defendant's credibility
in a later proceeding, see Cotton v. United States, 355 F.2d 480 (10th Cir. 1966);
Fagerstrom v. United States, 311 F.2d 717, 720 (8th Cir. 1963). See also People v.
Rahming, 26 N.Y.2d 411, 259 N.E.2d 727, 311 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1970); People v. Hurst,
10 N.Y.2d 939, 179 N.E.2d 861, 224 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1961).
44. People v. Duffy, 36 N.Y.2d 258, 262, 326 N.E.2d 804, 806, 367 N.Y.S.2d 236,
239 (1975).
45. While.the courts admit that the prior bad acts have a bearing on the truthfulness of the defendant, they state, on the other hand, that "the law is inflexibly set
against questioning as to such acts when the obvious intent is to show from character
or experience a propensity to commit the crime." Id. 326 N.E.2d at 806, 367 N.Y.S.2d
at 240. See State v. Marinski, 139 Ohio St. 559, 41 N.E. 2d 387 (1942) where the court
permitted the impeachment of the defendant by using the adjudication of delinquency and commitment to a juvenile home because the defendant submitted evidence to support his credibility. The court distinguished the case of Malone v. State,
130 Ohio St. 443, 200 N.E. 473 (1936) where the court held that the defendant could
not be impeached with his prior juvenile adjudications. The court in Marinski stated
that the defendant in Malone did not offer any evidence about his past years while in
the instant case the defendant did offer such evidence. See also Irvin v. State, 324
So.2d 684, 686 (Fla. 1976) (if the defendant admits that he committed the crime, an
inquiry cannot be pursued by the prosecutor to the point of admitting the type of
crime). See generally Czarnecki v. Stitzel, 179 Pa. Super. 80, 115 A.2d 805 (1955).
46. Some courts, however, have held that when a defendant in a criminal proceeding places his good character or past history in issue, the statutory prohibition on
the use of juvenile adjudications has been waived.
In State v. Richardson, 364 S.W.2d 552 (Mo. 1963) the court permitted the prosecutor during the trial to cross-examine both the State and defense witnesses regarding acts which occurred while the defendant was a juvenile since the defendant called
several witnesses to testify and establish his reputation for truth and veracity as well
as peace and quietude. The Court of Appeals, in holding the cross-examination
proper, noted that although the disposition of a juvenile was not deemed a conviction
and was thus not admissible to affect his credibility as a witness, the defendant chose
to call character witnesses and thus, they may be cross-examined as to "good faith"
rumors and facts within their knowledge that discredit the defendant. Id. at 555. See
Jackson v. Florida, 336 So.2d 633 (Fla. 1976) (once the "Character door is opened,"
all evidence that bears on the defendant's character such as a juvenile offense is admissible); State v: Briscoe, 78 Wash. 2d 338, 474 P.2d 267 (1970) (juvenile's past is
not clothed with immunity from disclosure when he places his character in issue). See
generally McArthur v. Cook, 99 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1957); State v. Rails, 213 Kan. 249,
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in the face of the underlying purposes of the various state
statutes intended to protect juvenile records from disclosure.
The statutes enunciate a policy of distinguishing between juvenile adjudications and adult criminal convictions and mandate that the juvenile adjudications be more sparingly used.
Thus, where the statutes either expressly prohibit the use of
juvenile adjudications in subsequent proceedings or seal or destroy the adjudication, it is wholly inappropriate to circumvent the express intent by permitting the adjudication's use
for impeachment purposes under the pretext that the underlying facts and not the adjudication itself are being introduced. The better rule would be to exclude all evidence of the
adjudication and the underlying facts whenever the former offender is a defendant in a criminal proceeding. Since the purpose of the confidentiality statutes is to permit rehabilitation
without stigma of a prior record, the former offender should
be insulated from all disabilities attaching to his prior, and
presumably forgiven, criminal acts.
B.

Impeachment of Witnesses

Somewhat different considerations obtain where the witness sought to be impeached is not a defendant and therefore
has less to lose by the resurrection of his juvenile adjudication. Where a person is a witness, as opposed to a defendant
in a criminal court proceeding, he is not likely to be injured
47
by the impeachment beyond some limited embarrassment.
The defendant on the other hand stands to lose his liberty if
the jury fails to believe his testimony after hearing of his juvenile adjudication. The courts have, therefore, drawn the logical distinction and have permitted the non-defendant to be
48
impeached more freely.
515 P.2d 1205 (1973); See also State v. Matthews, 6 Wash. App. 201, 492 P.2d 1076
(1971) where the court disallowed use of a juvenile adjudication record to impeach
the defendant, distinguishing the case from one allowing use of such records to impeach a character witness.
47. See People v. Meadows, 46 Mich. App. 741, 208 N.W.2d 593 (1973) (statutory provision prohibiting the use of a juvenile adjudication from being used as evidence, was construed as only applying to defendants and not adverse witnesses). See
also People v. Yacks, 38 Mich. App. 437, 196 N.W.2d 827 (1972); People v. Basemore,
36 Mich. App. 256, 193 N.W.2d 335 (1971); People v. Davies, 34 Mich. App. 19, 190
N.W.2d 694 (1971).
48. See 3A J.WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 834 (rev. ed. 1970) "It would be a blunder of
policy to construe these statutes [forbidding use of juvenile records 'against the child'
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Although Michigan statute prohibited the use of a "disposition" of any child for any evidentiary purpose in any
court except juvenile court, the court, nevertheless, in People
v. Smallwood," held that this statute did not foreclose the defendant in a statutory rape case from questioning the complainant as to whether she had previously been in trouble as a
juvenile. The court justified its decision by stating that the
question did not refer to the "disposition of the child" or any
"evidence given in the case," thus concluding that the defense
was attempting to ascertain, rather than impeach, her
credibility.6 0
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Davis v.
Alaska,51 appears to support the validity of this distinction at
least where it is made in the context of a criminal trial. The
Court held that the failure to allow a criminal defendant to
impeach an adverse witness for bias by revealing the witness'
juvenile record violated the defendant's sixth amendment
right of confrontation. 2
In Davis, the defendant was accused of grand larceny and
burglary of a safe. The key witness for the prosecution, Green,
identified the defendant as one of two men present in the area
where the safe was found."' Green had previously been adjudicated delinquent for burglary and was on probation at the
time of trial.5" The defense in an attempt to show bias on the
part of Green, requested an opportunity, to cross-examine him
in any other court] as forbidding the use of such proceedings to affect the credibility
of a juvenile when appearing as a witness in another court." But see Hammac v.
State, 444 Ala. App. 459, 212 So.2d 849 (1968); State v. Wilson, 1 Wash. App. 1001,
465 P.2d 413 (1970); Banas v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 468, 149 N.W.2d 571, cert. denied,
389 U.S. 962 (1967).
49. 306 Mich. 49, 10 N.W.2d 303 (1943) (construing MICH. CoMP. LAWS §
712A.23 (1970)).
50. Id. Other courts have held that there is no reason for excluding the adjudication. See People v. Basemore, 36 Mich. App. 256, 193 N.W.2d 335 (1971); People v.
Davies, 34 Mich. App. 19, 190 N.W.2d 694 (1971); State v. Searle, 125 Mont. 467, 239
P.2d 995 (1952).
51. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
52. Id. at 320. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in part: "In all criminal prosecu-

tions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him." In reversing the lower court's exclusion of the witness' adjudication
record the Supreme Court thus laid down a rule of constitutional law requiring trial
courts to override state statutes forbidding the use of juvenile adjudications.
53. 415 U.S. at 309-10.
54. Id. at 310-11.
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regarding his juvenile record. 5 The prosecutor sought a protective order to prevent any reference to Green's record and
the trial court granted the motion.5 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction due to the restrictions placed on the defendant's cross-examination of Green regarding his probationary status. While admitting the legitimacy of the state interest
involved, the Court held that: "[t]he State's policy interest in
protecting the confidentiality of a juvenile offender's record
cannot require yielding of so vital a Constitutional right as the
5' 7
effective cross-examination for bias of an adverse witness.
The Court repeatedly distinguished between the use of a prior
adjudication merely to show lack of truthful character and its
use to show bias or motive:
We granted certiorari in this case to consider whether the
Confrontation Clause requires that a defendant in a criminal case be allowed to impeach the credibility of a prosecution witness by cross-examination directed at possible
bias deriving from the witness' probationary status as a
juvenile delinquent when such an impeachment would
conflict with a State's asserted interest in preserving the
confidentiality of juvenile adjudications of a de58
linquency.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart emphasized, "that
the Court neither holds nor suggests that the Constitution
confers a right in every case to impeach the general credibility
of a witness through cross-examination about his past delinquency adjudications or criminal convictions. 5 9 Some courts
have overlooked this caveat and have applied the Davis ratio55. Id. at 311. The court stated "[a] more particular attack on ... credibility"
occurs when impeachment is used to reveal bias as opposed to the disclosure of a
prior conviction. Id. at 316.
56. Id. at 311 n.1. The trial court relied on the ALASKA RULE OF CHILDREN'S
PROCEDURE and the Alaska statute concerning the admissibility of juvenile adjudication. The rule provided in pertinent part: "no adjudication, order, or disposition of a

juvenile case shall be admissible in a court not acting in the exercise of juvenile jurisdiction except for use in a presentencing proceeding in a criminal case where the
superior court in its discretion, determines that such is appropriate." ALASKA RULE O
CHILDREN'S PROC. 23.

The Alaska statute provided in part: "the commitment and placement of child
and evidence given in the court are not admissible as evidence against the minor in a
subsequent case or proceedings in any other court." ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080 (1979).
57. 415 U.S. at 320.
58. Id. at 309.
59. Id. at 321 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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nale blindly in all situations involving impeachment by a juvenile adjudication.
The significance of the Davis opinion lies in what it fails
to contain. While admitting the legitimacy of the state interest involved, the Court's holding that the state "cannot, consistent with the right of confrontation, require the petitioner
to bear the full burden of vindicating the State's interest in
the secrecy of juvenile criminal records," 0 did not articulate
meaningful guidelines for accommodating these conflicting interests. Additionally, while Davis seems to approve of broader
impeachment of a witness, its constitutional ruling is a narrow
one.
In People v. Eatherly,' for example, the Illinois Appeals
Court, in upholding the trial court's decision prohibiting the
defense from impeaching a witness with a prior juvenile adjudication, held that Davis did not remove all restrictions from
the use of juvenile records in cross-examining a prosecution
witness. In barring the cross-examination, the court cited Illinois' policy of confidentiality of juvenile records6 2 and noted
that "in determining the permissible scope of cross-examination in such cases the trial court should balance the importance of the juvenile's testimony to defendant's case against
the state's policy of preserving the anonymity of a juvenile's
record."6 3 Since the prosecution witness was not the only witness to the crime, not the crucial identification witness as in
Davis, the court affirmed the trial court's decision.
Similarly in Commonwealth v.Santos, " a case involving
rape, unnatural sexual intercourse and kidnapping, the complainant had a juvenile record which had been sealed pursuant to a state statute. 5 At the time of trial, she was not on
probation nor did the defense contend that she had any motive to please the prosecution. The defense sought to impeach
her with her past juvenile record. The Supreme Judicial Court
60. Id. at 320.
61. 78 I1. App. 3d 777, 397 N.E.2d 533 (1979).
62. See ILL: REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 702-09 (1969); which provided: "[n]o adjudication, disposition or evidence given in proceedings under the Act is admissible as evidence against the minor for any purpose whatsoever in any civil, criminal or other

cause or proceeding except in subsequent proceedings under this Act concerning the
same minor."
63. 78 I11. App. 3d at 784, 397 N.E.2d at 538.
64. 376 Mass. 920, 384 N.E.2d 1202 (1978).
65. MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 276 § 10B (West 1972).
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of Massachusetts, relying on Davis, affirmed the defendant's
conviction holding that the considerations of Davis were not
present.6 The court noted that some of the critical factors
that aid a court in determining whether the juvenile record
should be used are: "(1) the probationary status of the witness
(2) some suspicion focusing on the witness, and (3) the wit'
ness' motives to please the prosecution."11

In Lewis v. United States,68 the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, although using a different approach, held
that under some circumstances impeachment of a witness'
general credibility may be permitted. The appellant contended that the trial court erred in failing to require the government to produce at trial all impeachable convictions of the
government's witnesses including juvenile adjudications. The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, despite a strong statutory policy favoring confidentiality, held that when the impeachment of the witness' general credibility is likely to be
material to the outcome of the trial, the defendant, as a matter of due process, was entitled to the juvenile adjudications
for that purpose. 9
66. The court distinguished one of its previous cases, Commonwealth v. Ferrara,
368 Mass. 182, 330 N.E.2d 837 (1975), where the same statutory mandate in Santos
operated to permit the defense to examine the records of the juvenile offenses of a
prosecution witness. Unlike the witness in Santos, the witness in Ferrara was 14
years old at the time of the trial and had multiple charges and an adjudication from
the time he was 12 years old. Additionally, the considerations in Davis, such as bias
were present in Ferrara.
67. 376 Mass. at 923, 384 N.E.2d at 1205. The party seeking to impeach the
adverse witness must show more than the fact a juvenile adjudication exists. See generally Lewis v. United States, 408 A.2d 303 (D.C. 1979); Smith v. United States, 392
A.2d 990 (D.C. 1978); State v. Tolliver, 562 S.W.2d 714 (Mo. 1978); State v. Burr, 18
Or. App. 495, 525 P.2d 1067 (1974); Connor v. State, 537 P.2d 715 (Wyo. 1975).
68. 393 A.2d 109 (D.C. 1978), afl'd on rehearing, 408 A.2d 303 (D.C. 1979).
69. The Lewis Court relying on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), held
that:
[1] If on the basis of the government's representation-or later on
the basis of the witness' testimony at trial-the court concludes that the
juvenile adjudication goes to bias, the court shall order its disclosure to
the defense.
[2] If the court concludes, prior to completion of the witness' testimony, that the adjudication does not go to bias, the court shall withhold
it from the defense unless the court becomes convinced that impeachment of the witness on the basis of the adjudication is likely to be material to the outcome. In that case the court shall order its disclosure to
the defense.
408 A.2d at 312. See generally Tabron v. United States, 410 A.2d 209 (D.C. 1979).
Prior to rehearing in Lewis, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Smith
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In sum, Eatherly, Santos and Lewis suggest quite properly that Davis did not eliminate all restrictions on the use of
prior juvenile adjudications for impeachment purposes in
criminal proceedings. More importantly, these cases suggest
that only a demonstrable showing of prejudice of constitutional dimension can overcome the presumption of confidentiality of juvenile adjudications.
Some courts, however, extended the limited holding of
Davis far beyond that justified by the Court's narrow ruling.
For example, in State v. Cox, 7 0 the Supreme Court of Ohio
held that the state's policy of maintaining the confidentiality
of juvenile records must yield to a criminal defendant's right
to present all relevant and probative evidence that pertains to
a specific material issue in the case. 71 The court's decision
constituted a compromise of Davis' significance. Although
prohibiting a fishing expedition into the witness' juvenile
background, it nevertheless allowed the defendant to impeach
the witness without any showing by the defense that the witness was biased or had a motive to give false testimony. In
New Jersey v. Ramos, 72 the court granted a defendant's pretrial motion in a murder case for the disclosure of juvenile
charges against a state witness despite a statute which precluded reference to a former offender's juvenile record. The
appellate court upheld the decision and concluded that effective cross-examination under Davis "cannot be sensibly met
without permitting the examination not only of the 'probation
status' of the juvenile but also of the charge upon which it is
7
based."1 8
Although Davis established the principle that a criminal
defendant's constitutional right to confrontation may be violated by refusal to allow impeachment of a key proser ition
witness by using his juvenile record, Davis did not hold that a
juvenile's record is always admissible to impeach a witness'
credibility. The concurring opinion of Justice Stewart specifiv. United States, 392 A.2d 990 (D.C. 1978), held that the sixth amendment did not
require the trial court to permit impeachment with juvenile adjudications unless
there was a showing of bias. The court further held that a juvenile record which went
to general credibility, not bias, "was not 'material' to the issue of guilt" and thus did

not violate the defendant's due process under Brady. Id. at 992 n.3.
70.
71.
72.

42 Ohio St. 2d 200, 327 N.E.2d 639 (1975).
Id. at 203, 327 N.E.2d at 642-43.
169 N.J. Super. 573, 405 A.2d 442 (1979).

73. Id. at 574, 405 A.2d at 443.
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cally states that there is no right in every case to impeach a
witness with past adjudications of delinquency.7 '
The most serious misreading of Davis is found in the Supreme Court of Kansas' opinion in State v. Wilkins.78 There,
the court interpreted Davis as altering the procedures for
cross-examining a juvenile witness who testified for the defense, despite a statute which provided for the confidentiality
of juvenile records. 76 The prosecutor sought to impeach the
defense witness with his prior juvenile record of burglary and
theft. The local court refused to issue a protective order
against the use of the juvenile record. After examining Davis,
the court concluded that the rule permitting the use of a juvenile's record is a double-edged sword." The court reasoned
that if the rule applies to a prosecution witness, then it applies to a defense witness.
Wilkins and similar decisions have emasculated the importance of the juvenile statutes in their handling of juvenile
adjudication records. There is no question that where a statute providing for the confidentiality of juvenile records conflicts with the Constitution, the statute must yield. The
court's use of Davis, however, was improper in that it overlooked the limited nature of Chief Justice Burger's holding
that the State's interest in protecting the anonymity of the
juvenile offender is outweighed by the defendant's sixth
amendment right of confrontation. The state has no corresponding constitutional right to confront witnesses, nor does
Davis create such a right.
In addition to the constitutional aspects of impeaching a
witness with juvenile adjudication records, there are personal
factors which must be taken into consideration. Allowing the
impeachment of a witness may produce significant untoward
effects upon the witness including embarrassment, making the
witness relive the past, and making public what had been secret for a long time.78 Some courts have ignored these negative
effects of impeachment and erroneously construed Davis so as
to permit free impeachment of witnesses with prior juvenile
adjudications. Unfortunately, Davis and its progeny have
74.
75.

76.
77.
78.

415 U.S. at 321 (Stewart, J., concurring).
215 Kan. 145, 523 P.2d 728 (1974).
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-801, 38-815(g) (1973).
215 Kan. at 149-50, 523 P.2d at 732.
State v. Guerrero, 58 Ariz. 421, 120 P.2d 798 (1942).
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opened the door for these courts to find a seemingly legitimate way of circumventing the state's policy decision to rehabilitate juvenile offenders rather than to punish them. Accordingly, the effectiveness of the statutes, has been drastically
diminished.
Davis represents a significant qualification on statutes
protecting the anonymity of juvenile offenders. Yet, as the
state courts have applied the decision, it has had far more significant ramifications than intended by the Supreme Court.
Davis by its terms has no effect where the former juvenile offender is the defendant since constitutional dimensions are
lacking. Contrary to the court's opinion in Wilkins, Davis
does not apply when a former offender testifies for the defendant. It is apparent in viewing the factual circumstances surrounding Davis that its holding cannot extend beyond the circumstances at issue in Davis to establish a rule embracing
other situations.
For purposes of impeachment, a defendant should be permitted to use the adjudications only in two narrowly circumscribed situations: first, to establish bias or motive to testify
falsely, and second, if the adjudication is likely to be material
to the outcome of the trial. In the absence of these considerations, statutes which protect a juvenile's record from disclosure should not be construed to permit access to the records
in order to impeach the general credibility of the former
offender.
C. Sentencing
Even in those states that prohibit the use of a juvenile
adjudication as evidence against the former offender, little
protection is afforded if the former offender is subsequently
convicted of a crime. Most courts permit the sentencing judge
to consider the juvenile court records when imposing sentence.79 For example, in Commonwealth v. Myers,80 the defen79. Berfield v. State, 458 P.2d 1008 (Alaska 1969); State v. Corral, 21 Ariz. App.
520, 521 P.2d 151 (1974); Massey v. State, 256 A.2d 271 (Del. 1969); Dickens v. State,
368 So.2d 950 (Fla. 1979); State v. Nobriga, 56 Hawaii 71, 527 P.2d 1269 (1974); People v. LaPine, 47 Mich. App. 553, 209 N.W.2d 726 (1973); People v. Pence, 42 Mich.
App. 215, 217, 201 N.W.2d 275, 276 (1972); State v. Radi, 168 Mont. 451, 604 P.2d
318, (1979); State v. Jones, 91 N.J. Super. 67, 219 A.2d 193 (1966); Young v. State,
553 P.2d 192 (Okla. 1976); Mitchell v. Gladden, 229 Or. 192, 366 P.2d 907 (1961);
Commonwealth v. Myers, 393 Pa. 224, 122 A.2d 367 (1958); Taylor v. Howard, 111
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dant, after pleading guilty to the charges of larceny, burglary
and receiving stolen goods, was brought before the court for
sentencing."' The Pennsylvania statute dealing with the handling of juvenile adjudication records provided that: "The disR.I. 527 304 A.2d 891 (1973); Walker v. State, 493 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. 1973); State v.
Dainard, 85 Wash. 2d 624, 537 P.2d 760 (1975). But see People v. Crable, 80 I1. App.
2d 243, 225 N.E.2d 76 (1967) (sentencing judge cannot consider the defendant's stay
at a state training school when he was a juvenile in determining the sentence to impose); Carlin v. State, 254 Ind. 332, 259 N.E.2d 870 (1970) (if defendant's juvenile
record had been destroyed pursuant to statutory provisions it would not have appeared in the presentence investigation report); Garcia v. State, 571 P.2d 606 (Wyo.
1977) (prior juvenile record that had been expunged is presumed to have been disregarded by the sentencing judge since it was improper to consider and the judge said
he would not consider it).
Many of the sealing statutes are silent on the use of the juvenile adjudication at
sentencing, while others explicitly permit their use. Alaska permits the use of sealed
records for a presentencing report. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.090(a) (1975); Colorado provides that any future inspection of the sealed records can only be made upon petition
by the person whose records were sealed and only to those persons named in the
petition. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-111 (1978); Maryland permits the unsealing for
good cause shown. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3.828(c) (1980); Nevada permits the inspection of the records by the district attorney or an attorney representing
a defendant in a criminal action to obtain information relating to a person involved in
the incident recorded. NEV. REV. STAT. § 62.275 (1979); New Jersey nullifies the sealing order if the former offender is convicted of a crime subsequent to their sealing.
N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A: 4-67(e) (Supp. 1981); South Dakota permits inspection of the

sealed records for sentencing purposes on a felony charge. S.D.

CODIFIED LAws ANNO-

1978 § 26-8-57 (Supp. 1981); Utah permits inspection of the sealed records
upon petition by the person who is the subject of the records and only to persons
named in the petition. UTAH CODE ANN. 78-3a.56 (1977). See generally VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 33 § 665 (1981).
80. 393 Pa. 224, 144 A.2d 367 (1958).
81. At the time of sentencing the defendant's juvenile record was brought to the
attention of the sentencing judge. The judge also had personal knowledge of the defendant's record since four years previously he had placed the defendant on probation for burglary. At the sentencing, the judge addressed the defendant as follows:
This Court tried to help you many years ago by placing you on probation when you were charged with burglary as a boy. You committed a
serious crime there. . . .This Court was so anxious to help you and to
make a man of you that instead of sending you away, as we might have
done, we placed you on probation in [the] charge of Miss Bright, the
Probation Officer. We did not hear any more about you after that until
this occurrence here. That should have taught you several things. It
should have taught you in the first place, that it is foolish, it is stupid, it
is just plain dumb, to commit crimes. There is nothing gained by it. You
are no richer than you were because of these crimes. Everybody that
knows you will now despise you. They will look down upon you. Everybody of any intelligence, everybody of any standing or decency now
looks down upon you as just a stupid, common criminal. Now can you
think of anything that could be said in your favor? I can't think of
anything.
182 Pa. Super. Ct. 169, 174 n.1, 126 A.2d 485, 487 n.1., (1956).
TATED
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position of a child or any evidence given in a juvenile court
shall not be admissible as evidence against the child in any
case or proceeding in any other court."'"
Ignoring this statute, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held that the statute did not apply in the sentencing context
because the judge was entitled to all of the material facts to
assist him in determining the character of the defendant and
what penalty to impose.e8 The court based its decision on the
definition of the word "evidence" which is "[a]ny species of
proof, or probative matter, legally presented at the trial of an
issue, by the act of the parties. . . for the purpose of inducing
belief in the minds of the court or jury as to their contention,"" thus concluding that since the juvenile records were
only testimony and not evidence they were not prohibited by
the statute.8"
Even in those few states which prohibit the use of the
adjudication "for any purpose whatsoever," the courts have
circumvented the statutes by construing them so as to permit
the sentencing judge to consider the juvenile history of the
adult offender.86 In People v. McFarlin,87 for example, the Supreme Court of Michigan reversed a decision of the Michigan
Court of Appeals which prohibited the use of the juvenile record for the purpose of sentencing 8 based on its belief that
evidence of the record was necessary to enable the sentencing
82. Id. at 174 n.1, 126 A.2d 487 n.1.
83. 393 Pa. at 231, 144 A.2d at 371. The court relied on the earlier statement of
Judge Woodside in the case of Czarnecki v. Stitzel, 179 Pa. Super. Ct. 80, 82-83, 115
A.2d 805, 806 (1955): "A sentencing judge. . . cannot with justice to. . .the public
ignore completely the boy's conduct during the time he was within the age of the
juvenile court law." 393 Pa. at 231, 144 A.2d at 371. See also Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241 (1949); Walker v. State, 493 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).

84.
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656 (4th ed. 1951).

85. Justice Musmanno dissented, stating that the statute specifically provided
that the juvenile court records should not be admitted "in any case or proceeding."
393 Pa. at 228, 144 A.2d at 371. The following states, however, have agreed with the
majority's construction of the statute in Pennsylvania: (Alaska) Berfield v. State, 458
P.2d 1008, (Alaska 1969); (Arizona) Arizona v. Fierro, 101 Ariz. 118, 416 P.2d 551
(1966); (Delaware) Massey v. State, 256 A.2d 271 (Del. 1969); (New Jersey) State v.
Jones, 91 N.J. Super. 67, 219 A.2d 193 (1966); (Rhode Island) Taylor v. Howard 111
R.I. 527, 304 A.2d 891 (1973); (Wisconsin) Deja v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 488, 168 N.W.2d
856 (1969).
86. See People v. McFarlin, 389 Mich. 557, 208 N.W.2d 504 (1973); Young v.
State, 553 P.2d 192 (Okla. 1976).
87. 398 Mich. 557, 208 N.W.2d 504 (1973).
88. "A judge needs complete information to set a proper individualized sentence." 389 Mich. at 574, 208 N.W.2d at 513.
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court to balance society's needs for protection and to maximize the possibility of rehabilitation for the offender.8 9 Inherent in this decision was the court's belief that an adult offender's prior juvenile history may reveal a pattern of
behavior that was not susceptible to previous rehabilitative efforts 0 and that the sentencing court should be aware of this
pattern.
A different approach is apparent in State v. Radi," where
the sentencing judge took into consideration the defendant's
juvenile court record. The appellate court noted that the purpose of the statute regarding juvenile records was merely to
prevent public dissemination once the juvenile was no longer
a minor. The court thus approved use of the adjudication
records for sentencing, noting "[tihere would seem to be no
other purpose in maintaining the sealed records of the youth
court over a period of at least ten years if they were not to be
used in considering the sentencing of an individual later as an
adult."9 2
Even where records of a juvenile adjudication have been
destroyed pursuant to statute, the courts have on occasion
sanctioned use of the adjudication in sentencing where it is
brought to the sentencing judge's attention by means independent of the record. In State v. Corral" the sentencing
judge had, by independent means, learned of the defendant's
juvenile record and had considered that record in sentencing
the defendant as an adult. On appeal, the court upheld the
sentencing judge, ruling that the judge's actions were no different from the case where the sentencing judge had initially
sentenced the defendant as a juvenile. The court noted that
89. Id.
90. See Annot., 64 A.L.R.3d 1291 (1975) for a list of jurisdictions which support
this view.
91. 168 Mont. 451, 604 P.2d 318 (1979).
92. Id. at 454, 604 P.2d at 322. At the time of sentencing the defendant was
thirty-four years old and had an extensive criminal record.
See generally D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2335(e) (1981) (will nullify any sealing order
if the individual is convicted of a felony subsequent to sealing). KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38805(d) (Supp. 1980) (allows a sentencing judge to consider the sealed record); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 32-1-45 (1978) (permits the setting aside of the sealing order if the former offender is subsequently convicted of a crime).
93. 21 Ariz. App. 520, 521 P.2d 151 (1974). ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-247 (Supp.
1981) permits the destruction of the juvenile records provided there is no pending
criminal proceedings.
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the destruction statute could not erase the judge's memory."
At least one court has adopted a different view. In Garcia
v. State,9 the defendant appeared before the court for sentencing, having been convicted of assault and battery with intent to commit rape. The presentence investigation report referred to his prior juvenile adjudication which had been
expunged. As in Corral, the court thus became aware of the
destroyed record by independent means. The sentencing
judge, without considering the admissibility of the prior juvenile record, held that it would be inappropriate for him to
consider anything the presentence investigation report referred to with respect to the expunged juvenile record, 96 even
though, as in Corral,he could not erase his knowledge of it.
Garcia presents the better rule. If statutes which provide
for the confidentiality of juvenile records are to be effective,
courts should be prevented from considering the defendant's
past juvenile record for purposes of determining what sentence to impose.9 7 Use of the records circumvents the statutory prohibition and penalizes the defendant for a juvenile
confrontation with the law.
IV.

CONCLUSION

If the statutes protecting the confidentiality of juvenile
records are to have their intended effect of restoring the former juvenile offender to his status prior to the adjudication,
then the use of juvenile records for purposes of impeachment
94. An independent ground for the Corral decision is evident. At the time the
defendant's juvenile record was destroyed, he had pending a new criminal charge.
Since one of the predicates for application of the destruction statute was the juvenile's freedom from further involvement in the criminal justice system, his records
were mistakenly destroyed. It was, therefore, particularly appropriate for the sentencing judge to rely on the defendant's juvenile adjudication.
95. 571 P.2d 606 (Wyo. 1977).
96. The Court in Garcia did not specifically address the admissability of the

expunged record but merely stated that: "the rule generally is that in such proceedings the trial court is presumed to have disregarded improper information presented
in connection with the sentencing proceeding." Id. at 608. See also People v. Reno, 17
Ill. App. 3d 348, 308 N.E.2d 3 (1974); People v. Bauer, 111 Ill. App. 2d 211, 249
N.E.2d 859, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1022 (1969).
97. See Carlin v. Burns, 254 Ind. 332, 259 N.E.2d 870 (1970) where the sentencing judge considered the juvenile record of the defendant contained in a presentence

investigation. The court held that only because the defendant's records had not been
destroyed as mandated by statute, was the sentencing judge's ruling not reversible on
this point.
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should be limited.
Where a state statute prohibits the use of juvenile records
in other judicial proceedings, either by way of specific provisions or indirectly by sealing or destroying these records,
courts should prohibit their use for impeachment purposes
against both a defendant and a defense witness. Where the
records are used to impeach a prosecution witness' general
credibility, the resolution of the issue of whether this adjudication should be admitted depends on the purpose of the impeachment and its potential significance in the litigation. If
the impeachment is for the purpose of revealing a witness'
bias because of a juvenile adjudication or his delinquency status, courts should permit their use. Even if this purpose is evident, however, impeachment should not be permitted unless it
is likely to be material to the outcome of the trial. Under all
other circumstances, impeachment through use of juvenile adjudications is inappropriate.
Since these statutes "are based on the philosophy that
fallen men can rise again and should be helped to do so""
their use must also be prohibited at sentencing. If the purpose
of these statutes is to prevent the "noncriminal rehabilitative
proceeding" from stigmatizing the offender or finding its way
into an adult proceeding, use of a juvenile record at sentencing directly contradicts the statutes' goals."
Judicial circumvention of explicit statutory language
prohibiting the use of juvenile adjudication records undermines the public policy which favors rehabilitation and ultimate eradication of past mistakes. Legislators should be aware
of the circumvention methods used by the courts and the ultimate effects of such action when drafting proposals regarding
juvenile records. If, however, it is the intent of a particular
state legislature to allow use of adjudication records in subsequent proceedings, the statutory language should precisely indicate when such records may be used and under what
circumstances.

98. State v. Miller, 214 Kan. 538, 544, 520 P.2d 1248, 1253 (1974).
99. In those cases where the courts have declared that the use of the juvenile
adjudication is error, rarely are those cases reversed, since the error only affects the
defendant's sentence which can be modified in some cases at the appellate level. See

People v. Crable, 80 Ill. App. 2d 243, 225 N.E.2d 76 (1967).

